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University of Michigan Law School Faculty Bibliography: Ben-Shahar, Omri (1999-2008)

Biography

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Bibliography

Books

  • Editor. Boilerplate: The Foundation of Market Contracts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Book Chapters

  • "Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto-Manufacturing Contracts." J. J. White, co-author. In Boilerplate: The Foundation of Market Contracts, edited by O. Ben-Shahar, 29-44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
  • "Causation and Forseeability." In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, edited by B. Bouckaert and G. DeGeest, vol. 2 (Civil Law and Economics): 644-68. Cheltenham, U.K.: Elgar Publishing, 2000.

Journal Articles

  • "How Bad Are Mandatory Arbitration Terms?" U. Mich. J.L. Reform 41, no. 4 (2008): 777-81.
  • "Partially Odious Debts?" M. Gulati, co-author. Law & Contemp. Probs. 70, no. 4 (2007): 47-81.
  • "Against Irreparable Benefits." Yale L.J. Pocket Part 116, no. 2 (2007): 381-4.
  • "The (Legal) Pains of Vioxx: Why Product Liability Can Make Products More Dangerous." Economists' Voice 3, no. 6 (2006): 1-4.
  • "On the Stickiness of Default Rules." J.A.E. Pottow, co-author. Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 33, no. 3 (2006): 651-82.
  • "Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts." J. J. White, co-author. Mich. L. Rev. 104, no. 5 (2006): 953-82.
  • "The (Legal) Value of Chance: Distorted Measures of Recovery in Private Law." R. A. Mikos, co-author. Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 7, no. 2 (2005): 484-522.
  • "Legal Durability." Rev. L. & Econ. 1, no. 1 (2005): 15-53.
  • "Credible Coercion." O. Bar-Gill, co-author. Tex. L. Rev. 83, no. 3 (2005): 717-80.
  • "An Ex-Ante View of the Battle of the Forms: Inducing Parties to Draft Reasonable Terms." Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 25, no. 3 (2005): 350-70.
  • "Threatening an Irrational Breach of Contract." O. Bar-Gill, co-author. Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 11 (2004): 143-70.
  • "The Law of Duress and the Economics of Credible Threats." O. Bar-Gill, co-author. J. Legal Stud. 33, no. 2 (2004): 391-430.
  • "Mutual Assent Versus Gradual Ascent: The Debate Over the Right to Retract." U. Pa. L. Rev. 152, no. 6 (2004): 1947-55.
  • "Contracts without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual Liability." U. Pa. L. Rev. 152, no. 6 (2004): 1829-72.
  • "'Agreeing to Disagree': Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts." Wis. L. Rev. 2004, no. 2 (2004): 389-428. (Freedom from Contract Symposium.)
  • "The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence." O. Bar-Gill, co-author. Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 5, no. 2 (2003): 433-69.
  • "Precontractual Reliance." L. A. Bebchuk, co-author. J. Legal Stud. 30, no. 2 (2001): 423-57.
  • "The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law." L. Bernstein, co-author. Yale L.J. 109, no. 8 (2000): 1885-925.
  • "Linking the Visions." Law Quad. Notes 43, no. 3 (2000): 4.
  • "The Tentative Case against Flexibility in Commercial Law." U. Chi. L. Rev. 66, no. 3 (1999): 781-820. (Symposium: Formalism Revisited: Formalism in Commercial Law.)
  • "The Erosion of Rights by Past Breach." Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1, no. 1 (1999): 190-238.

Reviews

  • Review of Optional Law: The Structure of Legal Entitlements, by Ian Ayres. J. Econ. Literature 44, no. 2 (2006 ): 444-9.

Other Publications

  • "Preface: Or: A Boilerplate Introduction." Preface to Boilerplate: The Foundation of Market Contracts, by O. Ben-Shahar, editor, ix-xiv. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
  • Foreword to Boilerplate: Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium. Mich. L. Rev. 104, no. 5 (2006): 821-6.
  • "Freedom from Contract." Foreword to Wis. L. Rev. 2004, no. 2 (2004): 261-70. (Freedom from Contract Symposium)

Reprints (Articles and other publications reprinted in full and Law Quadrangle)

  • "Threatening an 'Irrational' Breach of Contract." O. Bar-Gill, co-author. In The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior, edited by F. Parisi and V. L. Smith, 474-500. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005. (Originally published under the same title in Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 11 (2004): 143-70.)